A little over two weeks ago, I wrote a blog post, which was an elaboration of an X.com thread. The topic: How many gods are there? The thread and, to a lesser extent the blog post (although most of those replying didn’t read it), caused a surprising amount of—ahem—controversy. No small part of the controversy took the form of abuse of me. The most interesting and substantive responses were not on X, but on this blog.
Where do things stand now? First, I feel I really ought to rewrite everything I expressed on this page, to go over the issues in proper order so as to avoid needless repetition. When I do that, I will probably want to draw some from Michael Heiser’s work and, probably, some responses that others have made to him before. But then we’re talking about a fairly significant project, and I might not have time and motivation to do that anytime soon.
For now, though, I want to add a certain point. A few days ago, another substantive response appeared in the form of an old-fashioned blog post response by Caleb Smith. In what follows, I will address a proposal Smith makes, without addressing everything in his blog post, some of which I agreed with in broad generalities, and some of which I have already responded to in my earlier post.
Caleb Smith maintains that the debate over how many gods there are is “fairly silly on almost all sides,” as the dispute concerned “all words and no substance.” Thus I find my arguments, being one of the sides, labeled “silly” since they are about a mere linguistic debate. I think it is quite obvious that Smith is wrong, and I have explained why quite clearly in my earlier post. As I said earlier, “polytheism is an ontological position, not a position about your personal objects of worship.” The question before us is “what should you put in your ontology, i.e., the set of things you believe actually do exist, in terms you use to describe them literally”—and that is a question of substance, not of words. If you say demons literally are gods, you have placed multiple gods in your ontology; and, as I put it in one argument, “the proposition that there are many gods (of the Gentiles) is contrary to the classical formularies of the Church” and thus “certainly heretical.” And, unfortunately for his argument, Smith simply did not address these points in his blog post.
Does that sound like a semantic dispute to you?
Now, I imagine what Smith might say in response to this, i.e., something of this sort: “You are drawing conclusions that are substantive, but your reason for doing so rests on a semantic dispute.”
Let me explain, then, where Smith and I agree and where he fails to deal with serious issues responsibly. The result should, I hope, be enlightening for those sincerely concerned about issues of heresy and orthodoxy.
Much of Smith’s post is spent in doing something I myself did, namely, to distinguish the ways in which terms for God (or the gods) in various languages are used, implying, quite correctly, that these senses are to be found in the Bible. He says there is a “primary traditional sense,” or the “proper sense,” of ‘god’ according to which the term “uniquely signifies the Cause of the world, the source of all its light,” etc.—there follows a definition of ‘god’ that makes the Holy Lord God to be god by definition. Take note of that interesting move. For my part, I do not propose a definition of the most proper sense of ‘god’, but I do speak of the use of the word (and its cognates) in the most literal sense.
Then Smith offers two more “improper senses” which correspond closely to senses I offered. Where he speaks of “gods” “by similitude,” I speak of a metaphorical sense. Thus judges are called elohim, and so are angels (both, in Scripture, only rarely). The nature of the metaphor differs when the word is applied to men and to angels. For men, they are judging in the place of God; for angels, they are messengers of and thus speaking for God. He also speaks of a sense of being a god “by office,” as Moses was a “god” to Aaron, which is true enough, although this too is metaphorical, and indeed, judges and angels are called “gods” by their offices as well, although the offices differ.
I am glad that we agree that there are such senses, and that it is not a proper sense, but a derivative one and—as I would say—metaphorical or symbolic, not literal.
But now we come to the first place where we might be said to disagree. Smith says that the “gods” of the pagans are “gods” only “by opinion.” But this, however, is not best understood as a sense of the word ‘god’. Rather, it is an incorrect use, such that, if we call these beings (assuming they really exist) “gods” then we use scare quotes (as I just did) and we speak quotationally. I suppose our quotational use of the word might be called a separate sense of the word, which describes beings as other people do—for the sake of brevity—rather than by how we ourselves describe them.
By the way, when a Greek speaks of Zeus and Apollo as “gods,” what does he mean? He does not mean that in his opinion they are gods, for that would be a circular definition. That is, no Greek would give this circular definition: “when I say they are gods, I mean that I call them gods.” No, he means to convey a certain thing about these entities, and in conveying that thing, he is mistaken. This is not just a little aside; it is absolutely essential, so we will spend more time on it later.
What Smith does next is rather puzzling. He offers up an “alternative ‘Heiserite’ sense” of ‘god’, and quoting Heiser himself, says that he took elohim, in its Scriptural use, to mean something like “inhabitant of the spiritual world.” Before we get into this, however, I want to raise a question that Smith never addresses: Is “spiritual world inhabitant” an alternative sense, which is another theory of what ‘god’ could mean, or is it a sense that is somehow consistent with the senses just introduced? It seems to me rather obvious that it is not consistent. “Spiritual world inhabitant” is a far broader concept than the definition of the proper sense of ‘god’ that Smith gave (“Cause of the world,” etc.). Human judges and Aaron were certainly not “spiritual world inhabitants” when they walked the earth, anyway. No, this is simply an attempt to gloss the word ‘god’ that applies specially to angels, demons, maybe the souls of the dead (as Saul in the Witch of Endor incident), and Yahweh, only.
But let us develop the puzzle further. Is this consistent or inconsistent with the metaphorical (or “similitude”) sense? It seems to me that it is inconsistent, because the metaphorical senses get their sense from the metaphor. That is, there is a specific reason that Scripture calls angels elohim in those few cases when it does so: They are messengers and agents of God. Similarly, there is a specific reason that Scripture calls judges elohim: They are sitting in the judgment seat of Moses and, thus, of God, applying God’s law and, one hopes, drawing upon the Spirit of God. This is all rather clear in scriptural context.1
But what about demons? They are sometimes called elohim. But here is the problem. In the places in Scripture where they are called that, the force of the word is certainly not exhausted by calling them spiritual world inhabitants. It is to say that these beings are wrongly worshipped by “the nations,” as only God may be worshipped. Again, the semantic force of calling Baal and Asherah elohim is not to say that they are denizens of the spiritual world, but to say that they (or their idols) are worshipped.
I know that someone might say that we can have it both ways. “Yes,” it will be said, “they are spiritual world inhabitants—who, according to the Gentiles, deserve worship. And that is entirely consistent.”
But there is a decisive response to the latter, which will, when understood properly, put a stop to the debate. The problem is entities like Zeus, Apollo, Baal, and Asherah, are also called false gods, and it is denied that they are gods at all. I will not get out the scriptural references, but this is a thing Smith spends no time discussing, and for good reason. Namely, if demons are false gods, then when we speak in passing of “the Greek gods,” we can be calling them “gods” only quotationally, not in our own voice. But we would admit that they are spiritual world inhabitants. It’s not false that they are inhabitants of the spiritual world; that bit is true. Moreover, if ‘god’ meant only “spiritual world inhabitant,” then Scripture would be teaching falsehoods in saying that there is only one God.
“But wait,” I will be told, “you are simply falling prey to the problem Smith has identified. You are simply failing to draw a necessary distinction!”
Very well, let us see if we can explain how that would work.
Consider “The Lord he is God; there is none else beside him” (Deut 4:35) We agree that this does not mean that only the Lord God is a spiritual world inhabitant. So what does it mean? If Smith’s earlier semantic work were capable of rescuing his position, he would be able to say, “This means that only the Lord is the Cause of the world, etc.; there is no other cause beside him, etc.” The problem is none of the pagans made such claims about their own gods—but they would strongly take issue with what Moses said. In short, if elohim, when it applies uniquely to God, means “Cause of the world,” etc., then by Christian lights, it is true necessarily and trivially, and pagans would not even bother to dispute that their own gods are gods in that sense. So that definition simply does not capture the sense and the purpose of Moses’ claim, “The Lord he is God; there is none else beside him.”
Again, all Christians agree with the pair of propositions; all hold them to be essential to orthodox Christianity:
- There is only one God.
- There are no other gods.
Smith does not dispute either (1) or (2), of course. So we need a sense of the word ‘god’ that makes both claims true—and true substantively, not trivially.
Indeed, we can lay out the dilemma in a table:
| Sense of ‘god’ | “There is only one God.” | “There are no other gods.” |
|---|---|---|
| Spiritual world inhabitant | False | False |
| Cause of the world, source of all its light… | Trivially true | Trivially true, and not disputed by pagans |
| A being that properly deserves our worship | Substantively true | Substantively true; disputed by pagans |
Let us examine discourse about the pagan gods with a similar analysis. Consider Paul’s statement, “But then, indeed, when you did not know God, you served those which by nature are not gods.” (Gal 4:8) We want this to come out entirely true. But, again assuming that the pagan gods that the Galatians used to worship, like Zeus and Apollo, are demons, then they are certainly spiritual world inhabitants. That is not what he meant when insisting that they “by nature are not gods.” We also cannot say that the word is used “by opinion” or quotationally, because he is specifically asserting that the pagan view, that they are gods, is false, since “by nature [they] are not gods.” Ergo we need some sense according to which (a) the pagans believe them to be or treat them as gods, while (b) Paul (and we all) believe them to be no gods at all. There is one sense in which this is the case, namely, they are higher beings deserving of our worship. The pagans affirm this; we deny it.
This too we may put in the form of a table analyzing the truth value of “by nature [they] are not gods” under different interpretations:
| Sense of ‘god’ | “by nature [they] are not gods” | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Spiritual world inhabitant | The claim is false; demons are indeed spiritual world inhabitants (by nature). | Paul would be stating a falsehood far from his point. |
| Cause of the world, source of all its light… | Trivially true. | Paul would be denying a claim nobody made. |
| A being that properly deserves our worship | Substantively true. | Paul would be saying something substantive, important, and on-point. |
I began the debate simply by asking whether it is acceptable to affirm that there are multiple gods, and I said: absolutely not. Smith came to the rescue of these “Christian polytheists” (as I absolutely insist on calling them) by saying that it’s all just a semantic dispute easily resolved by drawing distinctions. As we have seen, his attempt fails. This is no mere semantic dispute. It is quite substantive.
But let us try again to characterize their view charitably. They say something like this: “All we mean when we say that there are many gods, at bottom, is that Scripture called angels and demons gods. We mean no more and no less than that. And all they meant by ‘gods’ (or rather, by elohim and theoi) was an inhabitant of the spiritual world. We are not polytheists for saying this.” As Smith said, Heiser “adequately qualified” his usage.
I agree that this sounds perfectly reasonable. The trouble, as we have seen, is that we cannot make sense of important theological claims—affirming the unique existence of one God and denying other gods—by saying that such claims are merely about “inhabitants of the spiritual world.” The only way to make sense of these claims is to understand elohim and theoi in the framework I have set out in this and the previous post. Worse, when you claim, “there are many gods,” then what your words mean in a Christian context is that there are many angelic and demonic entities that are worthy of worship. If you affirm the existence of many gods, you are, like it or not, a polytheist.
You can deny this and insist that you are right about what elohim meant and still does mean. I am simply saying that your words have meaning independent of what you claim them to mean.
The significance of this debate, which goes well beyond a “semantic dispute,” can be seen in three features of the surrounding social context. The first is that many of the defenders of Michael Heiser on this point—including many of the most aggressively abusive accounts that attacked me—make it abundantly clear that they are not, in fact, orthodox Christians (or Christians at all). In other words, these are people who are inclined to say, “You can accuse us of being heretics and polytheists, and we will own it. We don’t care what you think. We understand these things better than traditional Christians do (and did).”
The second feature is the tension with orthodoxy itself. Theology, like philosophy, does indeed care about the words for things. This is why so much ink was spilled over whether the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were “persons” (hypostateis) and of the same substance (homoousia). The first line of the Nicene Creed asserts “one God.” Is that trivial? Can you imagine what the Church Fathers would have said if some fourth century theologian argued, “Scripture calls angels and demons ‘gods’ sometimes, so we should too.” Do you really think this would be readily dismissed as a semantic dispute? If it’s merely a semantic dispute, why do you think this view never made any appearance in any orthodox theology for 2,000 years?
The third feature of this debate is that words—especially important words like ‘god’—are historically important and have historic impact. Changing how we use them and think about them can be expected to have deep socio-cultural consequences; this is why ideologues have quite deliberately appropriated and redefined the very words used to identify the problems with their views (such as ‘rights’, ‘freedoms’, and ‘tolerance’). I invite you to think what will go through the heads of children and students—even seminary students—in a future Christian milieu in which angels and demons are routinely called “gods.” Adventurous sorts will ask why we aren’t worshipping them; they are gods, aren’t they? Indeed, that is already the case. Mormons, New Agers, and pagan types have latched onto Heiser’s work precisely because he seems to support their views.
Smith says “chill, guys, and always distinguish.” I agree about distinguishing. But the most important distinction here is that between God and demons, and orthodox Christians have always been very clear about which is which.
Footnotes
- For more textual argumentation, see the first piece and the commentary that follows.[↩]
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