Seminarium Theologico-Philosophicum:
Our Plan of Study

This seminar (see also subscription info) is best thought of as an online study group combining close reading and answering hard questions. This page details how we will conduct our study.

The seminar is dedicated to systematically reviewing a series of connected issues in philosophy of religion, philosophical theology, and theology proper, at the level of an upper-division undergrad or lower-level graduate course. Our focus will be mostly historical, i.e., on the classic texts and, to a lesser extent, some important contributions of the last 100 years or so. By the time we are finished, we should understand the broad fundamentals of the intersection of philosophy and the Christian religion, particularly those issues that inform a serious apologetic case for the existence of the Lord God, who is worshiped by Christians.

This work will take quite a while—very likely over a year, possibly over two years. Attempting to specify in advance how long seems like a pointless task. We do intend to make steady progress.

Essentially, each unit corresponds to a chapter of my book-in-progress, God Exists, a systematic case for the existence of the Christian God. Doing the background reading for each chapter, in order, is an excellent way to structure systematic reading of the history of natural theology (and, later, theology proper). The last reading of each unit will be my book draft. About this I will not post questions, but I will ask for feedback at that time. Having done a lot of relevant reading in advance, I think seminar participants will be in a good position to give critical feedback. Maybe I’ll solicit and answer questions about the text from you, if you’re up to it.

I. Topic List and Selected Readings

Note, we have not yet chosen all the readings and topics. Only the first unit has a very detailed plan right now, and only the more obvious readings are listed for the first eight units. How much detail we will go into, and what will be in later units, really depends on the participant feedback and what we learn along the way. I and my book project have my own requirements, but I am going to try to keep participants happy, too. If you have other recommendations (such as selections from other classics of the field), please let me know.

1. The Arguments from Contingency and Causality

Don’t we require a necessary being to explain why the things that seem contingent really must be as they are? And does this apply to the universe as a whole? If we explain the universe causally in terms of the Big Bang, how do we explain that? And if we explain the nomological structure of the universe in terms of fundamental laws, how do we explain them?

• Plato, Timaeus 17a–48b (a cosmology)
• Plato, Laws X 884a–900b (the original First Mover argument; buy but note, it’s a short selection; free from Bk. X start through to “denied the existence of the Gods.”)
• Aristotle, Physics II (the four causes), IV and VI (optional background), esp. VII–VIII (in VIII, esp. 1–2, 4–7, and 10–12; the classic Prime Mover argument; buy this or this, or ebook; free vol. 1 vol. 2)
• Aristotle, Metaphysics II (explanation and infinite regress), VI–IX (more Aristotelian foundations), esp. XII (elaborates the Prime Mover argument; buy; free or free pdf)
• Augustine, City of God VIII.1–6 (natural theology), XI.4–6 (eternity and creation; buy vol 1 vol 2, but it’s a short selection; free)
• Avicenna (Ibn Sina), The Metaphysics of the Healing I.5–7 (a version of the contingency argument) and VI.1–3 (on causality; I will make a PDF available)
• Thomas Aquinas, De Ente et Essentia (free); Summa Contra Gentiles I.12-17 (free); Summa Theologiae I.2, art. 1–2, and I.9 (free; it’s hard to find all of these in a single to-purchase package)
• René Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy III (two different cosmological arguments)
• Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, “Primary Truths” (PW, PE), “On the Ultimate Origination of Things” (PW, PE, MOPW, PT), “Metaphysical Consequences of the Principle of Reason” (PW), “On Contingency” (PE), “Principles of Nature and of Grace” (PW, PE, MOPW, PT), Leibniz–Clarke Correspondence (PW, PT) (buy PW; buy PE; free MOPW; free PT; I strongly recommend you just get PW, and I’ll give you a PDF with the one essay it doesn’t have)
• John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.IX–X (cosmological and other arguments)
• David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding IV–VII (on causation, read as a criticism of the PSR; buy; free or free)
• David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion IX (brief criticism of the Cosmological Argument)
• Bertrand Russell, “Why I Am Not a Christian” (free); “On the Notion of Cause” (buy; buy ebook; free)
• Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, Chapter 3 (“Cosmological Arguments”; an easy but good general intro to modern versions; buy)
• William Lane Craig, Reasonable Faith, Chapter 3, “The Existence of God (1)” (on the Kalam Cosmological Argument; buy)
• Other readings I might do with or without public comments, depending on who shows up:
  • Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways (chs. I–IV)
  • William L. Rowe, The Cosmological Argument
  • William L. Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz
  • Graham Oppy, Arguing About Gods, Chapter 3, “Cosmological Arguments” (Good overview of the recent debate from a skeptical point of view.)
  • Elly Vintiadis and Constantinos Mekios, eds., Brute Facts, Chs. 1–3 (It’s an intro to the contemporary defenses of “brute facts” in philosophy of science.)
  • J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, ch. 5
  • Paul Davies, The Mind of God, chs. 1–3 (tracks much of the same material)
• Larry Sanger, God Exists (draft), Chapter 1, “The Arguments from Contingency and Causality” (PDF will be supplied.)

2. The Argument from Design

What does it mean to say that derivative phenomena (or laws) “emerge out of” more fundamental phenomena (or laws)? If this is a real feature of the universe, how—if at all—should order and complexity be explained? Could we coherently stop with brute facts here? And if appeals to purposive action are introduced, what do such analogies actually justify?

• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I.2, art. 3 (the Fifth Way)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III.64–65 (on governance and order in nature)
• David Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion complete, except IX (read earlier)
• William Paley, Natural Theology, chs. 1–3 (the watchmaker argument)
• Carl G. Hempel, Aspects of Scientific Explanation: and other Essays in the Philosophy of Science, chs. 1 (“Studies in the Logic of Explanation”; optional, as background) and 9 (“The Function of General Laws in History”; on teleological explanation and emergence)
• Ernest Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation, pp. 366-80 (on emergence)
• Paul Davies, The Mind of God, chs. 4-5 and 8 (design argument and related issues generally)
• Brian Davies, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, ch. 4 (“Design Arguments”)
• Larry Sanger, God Exists (draft), Chapter 2, “The Argument from Design”

3. On Rationality, Eternity, and Unity

What can we really infer from the analogy to a “mind-like creator”? Why think that the creator must be rational, for example? Why not think there are many gods? Why not think that everything is God? How can the designer of space-time exist “outside of time”—does this mean God is sempiternal or atemporal, or can he be both? What does it even mean to ascribe “mind,” “rationality,” or “ideas” to a being so unlike us?

• Augustine, Confessions XI (the eternity of God)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, qq. 3, 9–11, 14–15 (eternity; simplicity and unity; divine intellect and ideas)
• Spinoza, Ethics I (classical statement of pantheism)
• Paul Davies, The Mind of God, chs. 6–7

4. On Life and Goodness

What is life, and can it be understood in functional terms? What does it mean for a system to be self-preserving or self-sustaining? In what sense can biological function ground judgments of value? How are concepts such as flourishing, need, pleasure and pain, and proper function shared by biology and ethics? Is life itself an intrinsic good, or merely instrumentally valuable? Why is human life more valuable than animal life? And if life is intrinsically good, what follows about the value of the source of life itself?

• Aristotle, De Anima II (nature of life)
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.1–7, X (esp. X.1–5; value rooted in life and proper function; the nature and value of flourishing human life)
• Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, qq. 4–5 (the perfect goodness of God)
• Jacques Monod, Chance and Necessity, Ch. 1–2 (the modern pushback against the teleological and function-based view of living systems; optional? pdf)
• Ruth Garrett Millikan, Language, Thought, and Other Biological Categories, ch. 1 (proper function as a biological category)
• Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, prob. Chs. 2–3 (a life-based theory of value; optional?)

5. A Natural Law Theory

Can right and wrong arise from life itself? How can proper functioning and a moral sense ground judgments of right and wrong? How can ends be “natural” at all, without collapsing into mere descriptions of behavior or running afoul of the is-ought gap? What role do pre-existing commitments play in our discourse about obligation—and how might they account for what we might call a “natural law” against, e.g., murder?

• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics I.8–13, II.1–6 (nature of virtue; to confirm later)
• Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I-II, qq. 18–21 (right action, obligation, and ends), 90–94 (natural law)
• Thomas Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity I.1–8 (eternal law and natural law, reason and will; free in modern English)
• Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, chs. 13–15 (natural law and right)
• David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature III.I. (is-ought problem, moral sense, and obligation rooted in agreement; selections later, at least the first several sections)
• G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica, ch. 1 (the open question argument)
• Philippa Foot, Natural Goodness, chs. 4–5 (obligation rooted in life and proper functioning)

6. The Argument from Morality

Which are the life-supporting virtues in individuals and societies? Are there human universals true of us as social animals? Does societal cooperation constitute a new layer of emergent, life-preserving complexity? Can positive law be understood as reflecting the moral natural law? Might we then conclude that the creator designed natural law to promote virtuous civilizations? To what extent does Divine Command Theory hold, and is it consistent with the idea that obligation can be explained in terms of life? Can these insights be used to support the pure goodness of the creator, in motives and actions?

• Socrates, Euthyphro (the Euthyphro dilemma)
• Plato, Republic VI-VII selections (the Form of the Good as that which shapes the highest reality)
• Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics II.7–9, III (virtues; to confirm later)
• Augustine, De Trinitate VI (goodness of God)
• Augustine, City of God, Book XIX (the goodness of society emergent out of God’s nature)
• Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I–II, qq. 95–97 (positive law as rooted in natural law)
• Thomas Hooker, The Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity I.9–10 (civil law’s origin and necessity; free in modern English)
• Leibniz, “Discourse on Metaphysics” 1–8 (the goodness of God)
• Samuel Clarke, A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God 8–9 (free; free but paraphrased)
• Kant, Critique of Practical Reason II.II.V. (“The Existence of God as a Postulate of Pure Practical Reason”; argument from morality)
• C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, Book I (argument from morality)
• Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, chs. 12–15 (locus classicus of modern revival of virtue ethics)
• J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism, ch. 6 (moral arguments)
• Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism, ch. 11 (God’s perfect goodness and the DCT)
• Robert Merrihew Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods, ch. 1–2 (DCT and the goodness of God)
• “Moral Arguments for the Existence of God,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy
• Maybe the DCT chapter in Timmons’ Moral Theory

7. On the Problem of Evil

How can a purely good creator permit pain, death, and wickedness? What does it mean for the universe to be developing, and why would imperfection be inevitable at earlier stages? Why are pain and death not merely compatible with morality but presupposed by it? What is free will as deliberative agency, and why does it entail the possibility of wickedness? Why would a world developing toward perfection through free participation be superior to one created perfect de novo? How can disorder be permitted without being willed, when viewed sub specie aeternitatis?

• Augustine, City of God, esp. Books XI–XII (free; evil as privation, divine goodness compatible with corruption and decay)
• Augustine, On the Free Choice of the Will (maybe, selections TBD)
• Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, qq. 22–23 (providence and governance), qq. 48–9 (the nature of evil), I–II, q. 79 (causation and sin)
• Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion I.18.1-3 (preceptive, decretive, and permissive will)
• Francis Turretin, Institutes of Elenctic Theology I.3, qq. XIV-XVI (distinction between preceptive, decretive, and permissive will)
• C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (selections TBD)
• John Hick, Evil and the God of Love (selections TBD)
• Alvin Plantinga, God, Freedom, and Evil (selections TBD)
• John S. Feinberg, The Many Faces of Evil: Theological Systems and the Problems of Evil (selections TBD)
• Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness, ch. 1 (general intro)

8. The Idea of a Personal, Communicative Creator

Given the multitude of purported revelations, how do we identify which might come from the God of natural theology? Why exclude non-monotheistic traditions and most modern or isolated claims? What cumulative evidence from natural theology supports inferring that the creator is personal? How can a timeless, non-spacetime-dependent creator still be personal and capable of action and communication? By what analogical reasoning do we infer a divine mind, and why does this justify ascribing personhood to the creator?

• Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy V (free; eternity compatible with personhood)
• Boethius, Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius (free; divine personhood need not be embodied)
• Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 13 (aa. 7–8)
• Bertrand Russell, “Knowledge by Acquaintance and Knowledge by Description,” in Mysticism and Logic and Other Essays (George Allen & Unwin, 1917) (background on how we “know” a person)
• Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds, ch. 8–10 (argument by analogy for the personhood of God)
• John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion, chs. 14–15 (maybe; defense of pluralism)
• William Alston, Perceiving God, ch. 7 (problem of religious diversity)
• Nicholas Wolterstorff, Divine Discourse, ch. 1 (divine communication in general; maybe other selections)
• Keith Ward, Religion and Revelation, ch. 1 (maybe, selections TBD; “signs” used in natural theology point to monotheistic God)

Later Units

Note: The following are less detailed and will be developed more later.

9. The Necessary God of Scripture

• Philo of Alexandria, On the Creation I–VI, XVI–XXXI (maybe; free)
• Philo of Alexandria, On the Change of Names, I-VI (maybe; free)

10. The Living God of Scripture

• Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics, ch. II (law/command vs. freedom) and ch. VI (maybe, “Christian Virtue”)
• James M. Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics: Prospects for Rapprochement, ch. 4 (maybe; natural law vs. theological ethics in the Bible)
• James M. Gustafson, Ethics from a Theocentric Perspective, Vol. 1, ch. 1 (maybe, “Christian Ethics” and “Philosophical Ethics”)
• Christopher J. H. Wright, Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (selections TBD)

11. Evil and the God of Scripture

• D. A. Carson, How Long, O Lord? Reflections on Suffering and Evil, Part 2
• N. T. Wright, Evil and the Justice of God (selections TBD)
• Eleonore Stump, Wandering in Darkness, chs. 9–12 (maybe)

12. What Revelation Is

• Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 43 (God’s mission to us), I-II, q. 109 (grace in general)
• Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III.91–118 (specific selections TBD; God’s purposes for man, and revelation)
• Herbert of Cherbury, On Truth (De Veritate), selection in Peter Hay, Deism: An Anthology (deism and revelation)
• John Locke, Essay Concerning Human Understanding IV.XVIII–XIX (revelation, faith, and reason)
• J. L. Schellenberg, Divine Hiddenness and Human Reason, “Introduction” (maybe other selections, TBD; divine hiddenness)
• Michael C. Rea, The Hiddenness of God (selections TBD; divine hiddenness)
• Mats Wahlberg, Revelation as Divine Testimony, ch. 6 (maybe; what we can expect revelation to be like)
• Mats Wahlberg, “Divine Revelation,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (free)

13. On Prophecy and Miracles

• David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Section X

14. An Argument from Scripture, in Twelve Acts

• Athanasius, On the Incarnation (free; why Jesus had to become the revealed, incarnate Word)
• Vatican II, Dei Verbum (free; the necessity of revelation, according to Scripture)

15. God’s Holiness and Man’s Fall

16. The Flood and the Scientific Objection

17. The Dispersal and Corporate Justice

18. God’s Covenant

19. Exodus and Law

… several more chapters here, on the “philosophical theology of the Bible,” have yet to be written …

Penultimate unit. The Argument from Religious Experience (planned)

Last unit. The Argument to the Best Explanation (planned)

• Charles Taylor, A Secular Age (selections, perhaps)

II. Plan for Reading Assignments and Q&A

I will regularly (perhaps once or twice a week) be posting reading assignments to the seminar homepage. This will include links to places where the text may be purchased or (in many cases) downloaded for free. I intend to assemble local copies of the free texts in the Downloads section.

I assume that most participants have day jobs and cannot commit to a lot of work—not as much as a usual graduate seminar. That said, I would like to get through 10–20 pages of reading per week; it might be more, but at this point, it is hard to gauge what is reasonable and thus to schedule assignments in advance. (I need feedback first.)

As to questions, what I have in mind (and this could change) is a procedure like the following.

(1) Post a question; for example:

Timaeus 27d: What does Plato mean by the question, “what is it that always is, but never comes to be, and what is it that comes to be but never is?”

(2) I might, if necessary, immediately clarify the intent of the question, for example by adding,

This is not a childish riddle. But it might be instructive to consider it initially as one, and therefore ask what it might mean. But, in context, what does it mean? This is an early use of the distinction between ‘being’ and ‘becoming’. Was it mentioned earlier in Plato’s works or in pre-Socratic works? What light do earlier and later mentions shed on the meaning?

(3) I will give each question its own post, to which I will encourage participants to respond. I have decided not to wait before I post my own response, although I could do that if enough people say they prefer that.

While it is possible to read a text and understand it in a “rough and ready” way without answering such hard questions, I find that the only way to come to grips with a text as it was understood by its author and keenest readers—both what it means and what one thinks of it—is by addressing such questions. Besides, answering such questions turns out to be serious philosophical fun.

Our pace will also depend on the importance and denseness of the text, which can be determined by how many questions I ask about the text. The purpose of the questions is to understand the text—it is the same sort of work done by any textual commentary. The questions will concern meaning or interpretation, first of all, and often that involves reconstructing arguments and definitions, as well as developing objections and speculating, “How might so-and-so respond to this objection?”

III. Policy on LLM Usage

I myself adhere to these rules, and I strictly require all participants to follow them as well:

1. “Getting ideas” from an LLM on how to answer a question is absolutely forbidden. The ideas you flesh out in an answer must be your own, period, no exceptions. Do not insult us and demean your own abilities by passing off a clanker’s ideas as your own.
2. All the more, using an LLM to write for you—even to rewrite for you—is absolutely forbidden. Trust me, nobody wants to read some LLM’s pseudo-cogitations about the questions, especially if they are passed off as yours. And we want all your nuances of style.
3. It can be acceptable to use LLMs to do some kinds of background research, so long as it does not involve (a) copying ideas that are substantially answers to the original questions or (b) relying on factual claims without fact-checking them. Do not depend on LLMs for quotations; find and quote from sources. Acceptable research uses would include asking, “Has so-and-so ever said such-and-such?” and then, if the answer is “yes,” looking up the reference and confirming the answer.
4. It is acceptable to ask for critical feedback from an LLM on the substance or the mechanics of an answer. The LLM must be instructed strictly to refrain from rewriting (which is what they by default understand by “copyediting”). Instruct them to list spotted issues.
5. I will not ask an LLM to give me other ideas for questions until I have completely drafted all the questions and answers. Obviously, I will be using my own judgment as to whether new questions might be added, and I will put them in my own words. (Humans are encouraged to suggest more, too!)
6. I or someone else might post LLM answers, strictly attributed. (We’ll see. Could be useful to catch the “cheaters.”)

IV. General Behavior and Moderation Policy

Generally, I expect participants to act like polite adults. I reserve the right to expel any member who, in my sole judgment, becomes a sufficient nuisance to the proceedings. (Prorated refunds would be offered in such a case.)

I seek peace. Sectarian debate, particularly when it is or threatens to become acrimonious, is welcome only to the extent that it is actually relevant to the questions on the table. Protestants, do not slag Catholics. Catholics, do not slag Protestants. (Ditto with other divisions.) Let me affirm explicitly that all Christians are welcome here, and we must act like it.

Indeed, everyone is welcome here—as long as they are capable of conducting themselves within the bounds required by the confessional but careful professional study of the philosophy of religion and theology. All of these words are important. This reading group is by and for actual (i.e., traditional, non-heretical, Nicene) Christians. Much of the professional study of the philosophy of religion and theology is conducted in such a way as to de-emphasize or dismiss the assumptions and concerns of what is called “confessional” (or traditional, or orthodox) Christianity. The STP sternly repudiates such an attitude. While as an unbeliever (or apostate, rationalist, or whatever) you may join and participate, you must conduct yourself with respect for Nicene Christianity and Christians—i.e., for our main intended audience. All others are here as guests.