I know one of the trickiest philosophical questions out there why does anything exist at all. Does Plato argue that the Maker was compelled by his goodness to make order and as such our universe? Was our world in some ways necessary?
“Compelled by his goodness” seems to me like a pretty good summary of Timaeus’ explanation. “He was good and the good can never have any jealousy of anything. And being free from jealousy, he desired all things should be as like himself as they could be.” If he used the word “necessary”, I don’t think he would mean it in the sense of “whether he wanted to or not”. It was necessary in the sense that he wanted to bring order to Chaos, and since there was nothing that could stop him from doing what he wanted, he inevitably did.
Good thoughts, Tom.
Does that mean, hypothetically, that if he would’ve chosen not to bring order, he would not have been considered good?
Reply to “Timaeus 29d–30b: What work does the assumption of the Demiurge’s goodness do for Plato?”