Qualities like eternality, power, and intelligence seem inherent to the very idea of a Demiurge, but drawing conclusions about his goodness and character strictly from natural theology is a more complicated problem. Even agreeing on a definition of goodness without the benefit of divine revelation is difficult in itself. I see we have several whole sections on goodness, natural law, and morality ahead of us, so I’m looking forward to reading about that in more detail.
One thing that is obvious is that even if God were cruel and capricious and everything we would call evil, there wouldn’t be anything we could do about it. The Creator doesn’t have to answer to his creation. And as Jesus points out in the parable of the talents, if we did conclude he was “a hard master who reaps where he does not sow,” that, if anything, should make us even more eager to avoid offending him. I would be surprised if a similar thought didn’t occur to Plato. I don’t doubt his belief in the goodness of the Demiurge was completely genuine, but I also suspect the most famous student of Socrates probably chose his words to avoid even the appearance of impiety before God and man.
Reply to “Timaeus 29d–30b: Why does Plato seem to assume that the Demiurge is “good”?”