A Sketch of My Theological Method

While thinking about a certain book on the history of religious ideas, I considered how my own approach to theology might fit into that enormous history. This led me to the following summary statement, for what it is worth, which I submit for your perusal.

I am, roughly speaking, a follower of Thomas Reid’s method of common sense. But I do not say, as Reid (and others, like Plantinga) did, that the existence of God may be known as a principle of common sense. Rather, I think that various specialized skeptical and critical challenges to both natural theology and systematic theology can receive useful support from common sense. My view is that we should not be over-impressed by what are, ultimately, merely speculative possibilities that critics simply make too much of (such as Descartes’ dreaming doubt and adventuresome naturalistic theories of the origin of the faith of Abraham). For this reason, I find myself with no small contempt for much of that approach to Bible study that goes under the self-congratulatory title “Historical Critical Method.”

I am a rationalist to this extent: I think hard questions are necessary and indeed are the lifeblood of deeper understanding of the things of God. I think it is possible to build a systematic defense of theism, but I think it is a serious strategic (and rhetorical) error to portray the arguments as anything other than elements in an overall argument to the best explanation. A certain notion is common in the practice of analytic philosophy of religion but rarely conceded in so many words, namely, that we can logically demonstrate things about philosophy of religion. This is a mistake. In their logical or philosophical method, these philosophers often mistakenly fail to see and properly employ the inherently and importantly inductive features of their arguments. In their implicit rhetoric or apologetic method, they mistakenly treat the arguments as compelling or constraining, rather than persuasive or worldview-shifting.

Similarly, I hold that it is possible and useful to defend biblical doctrine, and make it appear quite coherent, not resting on a simple (fideistic) reading of the Bible or stolid adherence to Church doctrine. Rather, we should seek to lay bare the coherence of doctrine with a rational, common-sense approach to natural theology or philosophy of religion. We should take an equally rational, common-sense approach to hard exegesis, archaeology, text criticism, and the like. While I say such things, I am not a “rationalist” of the old Anabaptist type, to the extent that reason and its “natural light” stand in judgment of Scripture. Nothing stands higher than Scripture.

Underlying this commitment, I hold that God and his creation are perfectly rational and thus amenable to right use of our reason; I think our reason is part of his creation. Hence, it does not surprise me that there are sensible inductive arguments in favor of it, nor that the word of God can be propounded in profoundly rational systematic theologies, nor that it can be defended with surprising strength against skeptical challenges. These projects—philosophy of religion, theology, and apologetics—require time and patience to engage properly. But, for some people, like myself, they elegantly express just why we can accept and advocate for the fundamentals of Christian doctrine.